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APPELLEE BLANDING CITY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant Blanding City, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby petitions this Court for a 
rehearing. The basis for this petition is that the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Laws v. Blanding City. No. 941415-CA, slip 
op. (Utah App. April 4, 1995) (attached hereto as exhibit A), is 
inconsistent with well-settled Utah law requiring a party to 
object to a trial court's failure to give a jury instruction in 
order to assign error for such omission on appeal. Moreover, 
Jury Instruction No. 17 correctly states Utah law under English 
v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993) , and was therefore proper. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Melvin Laws was injured when he fell from a 
dumping platform at the Blanding City Dump. In November 1991, 
plaintiff initiated this action against defendant Blanding City, 
alleging that his injuries were caused by defendant's negligence 
in the construction and maintenance of the dump. 
In February 1994, this case was tried to a jury. The trial 
judge gave both counsel a copy of his proposed jury instructions 
at the close of the parties' presentation of evidence. Plaintiff 
objected to Jury Instruction No. 17. Significantly, however, 
plaintiff did not ask the trial court to include a Jury 
Instruction regarding defendant's duty as set forth in section 
343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Nor did plaintiff 
object to the trial court's failure to give such a jury 
instruction. The court charged the jury as proposed, including 
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Instruction No. 17. Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict 
finding defendant not negligent. 
Plaintiff appealed this ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
contending that the trial court committed prejudicial error in 
giving Instruction No. 17. Jury Instruction No. 17 is taken 
substantially verbatim from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
343 (1965), which delineates the duty a possessor of land owes to 
an invitee. Jury Instruction No. 17 reads: 
Blanding City is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a 
dangerous condition at the Blanding City Dump 
if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knew of 
the dangerous condition or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have discovered the 
dangerous condition, and should have realized 
that the dangerous condition involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and 
(b) should expect that Melfvin] Laws will not 
discover or realize the danger or would fail 
to protect himself against it, and (c) 
Blanding City then failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws from 
the dangerous condition. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's 
decision. Agreeing with plaintiff, the Court concluded that 
section 343 of the Restatement of Torts, which Instruction No. 17 
was taken substantially verbatim from, should be read together 
with section 343A of that Restatement, which purportedly 
clarifies defendant's duty. Thus, the court concluded, Jury 
Instruction No. 17 alone was an incomplete statement of 
defendant's duty because an instruction regarding section 343A of 
the Restatement should also have been given. Laws, slip op. at 
2-7. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROPERLY OBJECT BELOW 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides, "No party may 
assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction 
unless he [or she] objects thereto." Utah R. Civ. P. 51 
(emphasis added); see Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 
P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984). Under Rule 51 and the attending case 
law, it is error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial 
court's decision on the basis that a jury instruction concerning 
the duties set forth in Section 343A was not given. This is 
because plaintiff failed to propose any such instruction and did 
not object to the trial court's failure to give any such 
instruction. -' 
If an objection is not made regarding the failure to give a 
jury instruction, the issue is deemed to be waived on appeal. 
VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 965 
(Utah App. 1988). It is well-settled in Utah that a party cannot 
assign error in the omission of an instruction that he or she 
failed to request at trial. State v. Valdez. 432 P.2d 53, 54 
17
 The grounds for any objection to failure to give a jury 
instruction must be distinctly and specifically stated on the 
record. VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distribs.. Inc., 758 P.2d 
962, 964 (Utah App. 1988); Beehive Medical Elec., Inc. v. Square 
D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983). The requirement of a 
specific objection on the record ensures that the trial court 
will understand the basis of the objections and have an 
opportunity to correct any errors before the case goes to the 
jury. VanDyke. 758 P.2d at 964; State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190, 
192-93 (Utah 1976). 
- 3 -
(Utah 1967). Indeed, lf[w]here no instruction was requested, 
there is no error in failing to give it.11 State v. Villiard, 494 
P.2d 285, 287 n.6 (Utah 1972) (citing Valdez. 432 P.2d 53). 
Accordingly, "the standard rule is that when a party fails to 
make a proper objection to an erroneous instruction, or to 
present to the court a proper request to supply any claimed 
deficiency in the instructions, he [or she] is thereafter 
precluded from contending error." State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190, 
192 (Utah 1976) (footnotes omitted). See also Redevelopment 
Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia. 526 P.2d 47 (Utah 1974); 
Valdez, 432 P.2d 53; State v. Peterson. 240 P.2d 504 (Utah 1952). 
In the present case, plaintiff did not request a jury 
instruction regarding the substance of section 343A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Nor did plaintiff object to the 
trial court's failure to give a jury instruction regarding the 
substance of section 343A. Thus, as argued by defense counsel at 
oral argument, there can be no error in failing to give an 
instruction regarding section 343A as no such instruction was 
requested and no objection was raised concerning its omission. 
Villiard. 494 P.2d at 827. 
The Court of Appeal's determination that plaintiff properly 
objected to the trial court's giving of Jury Instruction No. 17 
is insufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of the trial 
court's failure to give an instruction regarding the contents of 
section 343A of the Restatement. See Laws, slip op. p. 2-3 n.2. 
Plaintiff's objection to the giving of Instruction No. 17, which 
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concerns section 343 of the Restatement, is wholly separate from 
the court's failure to include an instruction regarding section 
343A of the Restatement. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in overturning the 
trial court's decision in the Laws case on the basis that a jury 
instruction regarding the substance of section 343A was not 
given. Plaintiff did not object to this omission before the 
trial court and thus failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
VanDyke. 758 P.2d at 964. The trial court in this case was not 
given the opportunity to consider giving a jury instruction 
regarding section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, nor 
did it have the opportunity to correct any claimed error before 
the case went to the jury. Without reversal of the Court of 
Appeal's opinion, plaintiff will have successfully challenged on 
appeal the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction 
without having objected to such failure or having requested such 
an instruction, contrary to Utah law. 
POINT II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 PROPERLY STATES UTAH 
LAW UNDER ENGLISH V. KIENKE 
As the Court of Appeals acknowledges, the general rule as to 
a landowner's liability in Utah is set forth in English v. 
Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). Relying on the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343, the court in English identified the 
areas in which a possessor of land owes a duty of reasonable 
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care.- Id. at 156. This excerpt from English identifying the 
duty owed by a possessor of land is virtually identical to Jury 
Instruction No. 17. Jury Instruction No. 17 is therefore a 
correct statement of defendants duty under Utah law as set forth 
in English. 
Although section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
343A may clarify defendant's duty, it is not the Utah law 
regarding a landowner's duty of care. Restatements are not law. 
Moreover, section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has 
not been adopted in Utah. Indeed, the Court of Appeal's decision 
in Laws was the first occasion on which a Utah court has held 
that section 343A contains a correct statement of a land 
possessor's duty owed to an invitee. 
Therefore, taken as a whole, the Jury Instruction No. 17 
fully advised the jury on the appropriate standard for 
determining defendant's duty of care to the jury under Utah law 
and was thus proper. 
- Those areas are: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his [or her] 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but 
only if, he [or she] (a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover 
the condition, and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such 
invitees, and (b) should expect that they 
will not discover or realize the danger, or 
will fail to protect themselves against it, 
and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger. 
English, 848 P.2d at 156 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
343) . 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider its 
decision in the Laws case as it is incorrect under Utah law. 
Specifically, it was error to overturn the trial court's decision 
on the basis that a jury instruction concerning the contents of 
section 343A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was not given 
because plaintiff failed present such an instruction to the trial 
court and importantlyt failed to object to any such omission of 
this instruction, in addition, Jury Instruction No. 17 properly 
stated Utah law as set forth in English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153 
(Utah 1993). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's decision should 
be reconsidered in order to correct these errors. 
DATED this . jH day of April, 1995. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By ^j^U^-^^^ 
CAROLYN S. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed first-class, postage prepaid, 
this (^ day of April, 1995 to the following: 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq. 
Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220 
Provo, Utah 84606 
By 
CAROLYN/^. JENSEN 
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EXHIBIT A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Melvin Laws, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v, 
Blanding City, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
FILED 
APR 0 41995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 940415-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 4 , 1995) 
Seventh District, San Juan County 
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
Attorneys: Darwin C. Fisher, Provo, for Appellant 
Gary B. Ferguson, Salt lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Onne. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Melvin Laws (Plaintiff) challenges a jury verdict that 
Blandmg City (Defendant) was not negligent in the construction 
and maintenance of the Blanding City Dump. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
After falling from a dumping platform at the Blanding City 
Dump, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendant, alleging 
his injuries were caused by Defendant's negligence in the 
construction and maintenance of the dump. The case was tried to 
a jury in February 1994. Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Defendant 
submitted to the trial court their respective requested jury 
instructions. At the close of the parties' presentation of 
evidence and outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge 
gave counsel a copy of the instructions he proposed to give and 
returned the parties' requested jury instructions to them with 
his notations as to which would be given and which would not. 
Plaintiff took exception to the court's proposed Instruction No. 
17, which set forth the duty Defendant owed Plaintiff. The court 
overruled the objection. 
Thereafter, the court charged the jury as proposed, and the 
jury returned a verdict that Defendant was not negligent. 
Plaintiff appeals, contending the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. IT.1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Determining the propriety of jury instructions presents a 
question of law, which we review under a correction of error 
standard. Anes v. Haas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah App. 1993). We 
review jury instructions ir. their entirety to determine whether 
the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on 
the applicable law. Id. "We reverse a trial court's decision on 
the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only 
where the party challenging the propriety of tae instruction 
*demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in 
the aggregate.'11 Id. (quoting State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 931 
(Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 846 ?.2d 1276 (Utah 
1993)) . 
ANALYSIS 
In support of his claim of error, Plaintiff argues that 
Instruction No. 17 is an incomplete and misleading statement of 
Defendant's duty.2 
1. Because ve reverse on this claim of error, we do not reach 
Plaintiff's additional claim of error, namely, that the trial 
court abused its discretion by excluding Plaintiff's expert 
witness in order to sanction Plaintiff for noncompliance with a 
scheduling order. We note, however, that the reasons for the 
trial court's sanction would seem to disappear on remand. 
2. At oral argument, Defendant raised for the first time the 
issue of waiver, claiming Plaintiff did not adequately object to 
Instruction No. 17 and therefore cannot now complain about its 
insufficiency. Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, "[n]o 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objeots thereto. In objecting to the 
giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection.'1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 51; see also Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft S Co., 622 
P.2d 1168, 1175 (Utah 1980 (holding defendant's assignment of 
error failed because, in taxing exception to instruction, 
defendant had not specified claimed error); VanDvke v. Mountain 
Coin Mach. Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988) 
(continued...) 
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Instruction No. 17 reads in its entirety: 
Blanding City is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to Melvin Laws by a 
dangerous condition at the Blanding City Dump 
if, but only if, Blanding City (a) knew of 
the dangerous condition or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have discovered the 
dangerous condition, and should have realized 
that the dangerous condition involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to Melvin Laws, and 
(b) should expect that Melfvin] Laws will not 
discover or realize the danger or would fail 
to protect himself against it, and (c) 
Blanding City then failed to exercise 
reasonable care to protect Melvin Laws rrom 
the dangerous condition. 
Plaintiff asserts that subsection (b), which refers to whether 
Plaintiff should have realized the danger or protected himself 
against it, creates the misleading impression that if Plaintiff 
did not do so, Defendant's duty is abrogated. 
Jury Instruction No. 17 is taken substantially verbatim from 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965), which delineates 
the duty a possessor of land owes to an invitee. Plaintiff 
2. (...continued) 
("If a party fails to object to a jury instruction, the objection 
is deemed waived on appeal."). 
In the present case, our review of the record reveals that 
the parties and the trial court, pursuant to Defendant's motion 
for directed verdict, discussed at length the proper standard of 
care with which to charge the jury. Defendant argued that "if 
the hazard is open and obvious and the type that Blanding City 
reasonably would believe people would avoid, then Blanding City 
has no duty to do anything." Plaintiff, on the other hand, 
argued that "there is a duty on the part of government to . . . 
take reasonable care to . . . ensure the safety of those that use 
their facilities, in this case, the dump." Moreover, Plaintiff 
submitted requested instructions to the court which, although not 
a perfect statement of the applicable duty, omitted the portion 
of Instruction No. 17 about which he now complains. When 
Plaintiff took exception to the trial court's proposed 
instructions, he referenced the prior discussion, as well as his 
proffered instructions, and the trial court overruled the 
exception "for the reasons stated[] when I ruled on the motion 
for directed verdict." We thus conclude that Plaintiff has 
properly preserved this claim. 
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concedes section 343 is a correct statement of Defendant's duty, 
but argues that it is not a complete statement of that duty and 
must be read together with section 343A. 
We agree. The correct statement of the duty Defendant, a 
possessor of land, owed Plaintiff, an invitee, is contained in 
sections 3 43 and 3 43A of the Restatement. See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343 cmt. a (1965) ("This Section should be 
read together with § 3 4 3A, which deals with the effect of the 
fact that the condition is known to the invitee, or is obvious to 
him, as well as the fact that the invitee is a patron of a public 
utility."); English v. Kienke. 848 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1993) 
(stating duty of possessor of land to invitee is set forth in 
§ 343 and § 343A). 
Section 343A reads, in its entirety: 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees for physical harm caused to them by 
an activity or condition on the land whose 
danger is known or obvious to them, unless 
the possessor should anticipate the harm 
despite such knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor 
should anticipate harm from a known or 
obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is 
entitled to make use of public land, or of 
the facilities of a public utility, is a 
factor of importance indicating the harm 
should be anticipated. 
Restatement, supra, § 3 4 3A (emphasis added). Comment f to 
section 343A reads: 
There are . . . cases in which the 
possessor of land can and should anticipate 
that the dangerous condition will cause 
physical harm to the invitee notwithstanding 
its known or obvious danger. In such cases 
the possessor is not relieved of the duty of 
reasonable care which he owes to the invitee 
for his protection. This duty may require 
him to warn the invitee, or to take other 
reasonable steps to protect him, against the 
known or obvious condition or activity, if 
the possessor has reason to expect that the 
invitee will nevertheless suffer physical 
harm. 
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Such reason to expect harm to the 
visitor from known or obvious dangers may 
arise, for example, where the possessor has 
reason to expect . . . that the invitee will 
proceed to encounter the known or obvious 
danger because to a reasonable man in his 
position the advantages of doing so would 
outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases 
the' fact that the danger is known, or is 
obvious, is important in determining whether 
the invitee is to be charged with 
contributory negligence, or assumption of 
risk. . . . It is not, however, conclusive 
in determining the duty of the possessor, or 
whether he has acted reasonably under the 
circumstances. 
Id. cmt. f. Further, comment g states: 
In determining whether the possessor of 
land should expect harm to invitees 
notwithstanding the known or obvious 
character of the danger, the fact that 
premises have been held open to the visitor, 
and that he has been invited to use them, is 
always a factor to be considered, as offering 
some assurance to the invitee that the place 
has been prepared for his reception, and that 
reasonable care has been used to make it 
safe. There is, however, a special reason 
for the possessor to anticipate harm where 
the possessor is a public utility, which has 
undertaken to render services to members of 
the public, so that they are entitled to 
demand the use of its facilities, and to 
expect reasonable safety while using them. 
The same is true of the government, or a 
government agency, which maintains land upon 
which the public are invited and entitled to 
enter as a matter of public right. Such 
defendants may reasonably expect the public, 
in the course of the entry and use to which 
they are entitled, to proceed to encounter 
some known or obvious dangers which are not 
undulv extreme, rather than to forego the 
right. 
Id. cmt. g (emphasis added). 
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We hold that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
17 to the jury as it is an incomplete and thus misleading 
statement of Defendant's duty. Plaintiff has the right to have 
his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way, and the trial court has a duty to instruct 
the jury on the applicable law. Ames, 846 P.2d at 471. Section 
343A substantially clarifies the duty Defendant, as both a public 
utility and a government entity, owes Plaintiff, a member of the 
public for whom the land Defendant possesses is held open. It 
also relates precisely to Plaintiff's theory of the case, which 
is that Plaintiff, who resides outside a public garbage pickup 
area and is required by ordinance to dispose of his garbage 
himself (or subscribe to a garbage pickup service), had no choice 
but to approach the thirty-foot precipice at the dump in order to 
throw his garbage over it. In these circumstances, Plaintiff 
claims, Defendant had a duty to protect Plaintiff because it 
should have known that a reasonable person would, recognizing the 
danger, nevertheless encounter it. See Donahue v. Purfee. 780 
P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah App. 1989). 
Moreover, we disagree with Defendant that the proffered 
comparative negligence instruction, together with the special 
verdict form, cured the deficiency in Instruction No. 17. If the 
jury determined that Defendant owed no duty of reasonable care to 
Plaintiff based on the incomplete statement of duty found in 
Instruction No. 17, then neither the comparative negligence 
instruction nor the special verdict form would have been helpful. 
fl[T]here would be no negligence to compare—and, therefore, no 
recovery" if Defendant's duty were erroneously excused because 
the danger is known or obvious. See id. at 1279. We conclude 
that the instructions as a whole inadequately presented the law 
with respect to Defendant's duty of care and undermined 
Plaintiff's ability to present his theory of the case to the 
jury. 
We must next determine whether the error was prejudicial. 
To require a new trial, we must conclude not only that the trial 
court erred, but that the error was prejudicial, that is, "that 
it ^endfed] to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advise[d] the 
jury on the law.'" Summerill v. Shipley, 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 
20 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 
(Utah App. 1987)). Moreover, the jury's application of an 
erroneous duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff is, in all but 
the clearest cases, necessarily prejudicial. Id. at 20-21. 
We have in this case an unusual insight into the jury's 
deliberative process. Midway through deliberations, the jury 
asked the trial court the following question: "Judge, the 
majority of us feel that both parties are at fault to some 
940415-CA 6 
extent. Therefore, would it be allcvable to compensate Mr. Laws 
a monetary amount for pain and suffering incurred for his 
injuries? If so, how can we go about this?" After conferring 
with counsel on both sides, the court sent back the following 
response: "The answer to this question is in the jury 
instructions and the special verdict form." The jury thereafter 
returned with a verdict. In response to special verdict question 
no. 1—"Was the defendant, Blanding City, negligent as alleged by 
the plaintiff?"—the jury stated, curiously in view of their 
inquiry, "No." 
Given these facts, we cannot say the jury was not misled by 
Instruction No. 17's incomplete statement of Defendant's duty. 
Rather, Instruction No. 17 may well have led the jury to 
erroneously conclude that, because Plaintiff should have realized 
the dangerous condition at the dump and protected himself against 
it, Defendant owed Plaintiff no duty of care. Accordingly, we 
conclude that Plaintiff was prejudiced, and we reverse and remand 
for a new trial. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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